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Abstract 
What are the likely consequences of Brexit for the status and rights of British citizenship? Can 
the fact that every British national is an EU citizen mitigate the possible negative 
consequences of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU on the plane of rights enjoyed by the 
citizens of the UK? These questions are not purely hypothetical, as the referendum on June 23 
can potentially mark one of the most radical losses in the value of a particular nationality in 
recent history. This paper reviews the possible impact that the law and practice of EU 
citizenship can have on the conduct of Brexit negotiations and surveys the possible strategies 
the UK government could adopt in extending at least some EU-level rights to UK citizens 
post-Brexit. The high cost of such rights at the negotiating table is discussed against the 
general backdrop of the legal-historical analysis of the tradition of flexibility in citizenship 
and territorial governance which clearly emerges in EU law once the post-colonial context is 
considered in full. A particular emphasis is put on the possibility of negotiating post-Brexit 
bilateral free-movement arrangements with select Member States: a deeply problematic 
practice from the point of view of non-discrimination and the basic idea of European unity. 
Aiming to address the core issues of the role of EU citizenship in the context of withdrawals 
from the Union the conclusions of the paper, pointing to a quasi-inevitable overwhelming 
downgrade in citizenship rights for the withdrawing state, are applicable to any withdrawal 
context, not limited to the UK per se. 
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EU Citizenship and Withdrawals from the 
Union: How Inevitable Is the Radical 
Downgrading of Rights? 
 
 
1. Introduction and conclusion 
 
This paper’s objective is to provide a thick context to the analysis of the 
eventual role played by EU citizenship in the context of the eventual 
withdrawal of Member States from the European Union.1 It thus does not 
concern itself with the issue of secessions of territories from the Member 
States as much,2 which result in leaving a newly-formed state outside (or 
inside 3 ) the European Union 4  – a matter meticulously analysed in the 
literature already.5 A number of interesting issues arises, however, even when 
                                                 
1 Cf. Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, ‘A UK Exit from the EU: The End of the United Kingdom or a New 
Constitutional Dawn?’ (2015) Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No 25/2015; Michael Keating, 
‘The European Dimension to Scottish Constitutional Change’ (2015) 86 The Political Quarterly 
208; Editorial Comments, ‘Union Membership in Times of Crisis’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law 
Review 1; Phedon Nicolaides, ‘Withdrawal from the European Union: A Typology of Effects’, 20 
Maastricht Journal 2013, 209; Nicholas Forwood, ‘Chinese Curses, Lawyers’ Dreams, Political 
Nightmares and New Dawns: Interesting Times for the UK’s Relationship with the EU’ (2012) 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 83; Adam Łazowski, Withdrawal from the 
European Union and Alternatives to Membership’ (2012) 37 ELRev 52. 
2 For an analysis of the factors connecting secessions and withdrawals, see, J.H.H. Weiler’s 
chapter in Carlos Closa (ed.), Troubled Membership: Dealing with Secession from a Member State 
and Withdrawal from the Union, CUP, 2017 (forthcoming). 
3 Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, ‘How Easily Could an Independent Scotland Join the EU?’ (2014) 
University of Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 46; D. Kochenov and M. van den Brink, 
‘Secessions from EU Member States: The Imperative of Union’s Neutrality’, Edinburgh School of 
law Research Paper No. 2016/06. 
4 See, in general, Carlos Closa (ed), ‘Troubled Membership: Dealing with Secession from a 
Member State and withdrawal from the EU’, (2014) EUI Working Paper 2014/91. 
5 See, most importantly, Daniel Kenealy and Stuart MacLennan, ‘Sincere Cooperation, Respect for 
Democracy and EU Citizenship: Sufficient to Guarantee Scotland’s Future in the European Union?’ 
(2014) 20 European Law Journal 591; Phoebus Athanassiou and Stéphanie Laulhé Shaelou, ‘EU 
Accession from Within? – An Introduction’ (2014) 33 Yearbook of European Law 1; Phoebus 
Athanassiou and Stéphanie Laulhé Shaelou, ‘EU Citizenship and Its Relevance for EU Exit and 
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one looks only at the citizenship issues related to the Member States planning 
to say goodbye to the journey in the unknown destination. 6  This is 
particularly so when the interplay of both the national and the supranational 
levels of citizenship is dynamically considered. Although my initial aspiration 
has been to provide a general analysis, on a number of occasions it has been 
impossible to overcome the temptation of referring to one specific Member 
State as an example: the United Kingdom. Whatever the outcome of the Brexit 
referendum, the example of the UK will remain sound, as it is specifically the 
UK, not any other Member State that triggered the whole debate on 
withdrawals from the EU. The discussion contained below, although written 
before June 23 2016 is thus as much connected to the UK specifically as it is of 
general application: the conclusions reached in this text are not at all country-
specific. It is this possibility to extrapolate these to the situation of any other 
seceding Member State while simultaneously nodding in the direction of the 
cause of the conversation about the withdrawals we are having that makes 
me comfortable with the occasional use of the British example. 
 
The key conclusion is very simple: the obvious loss of an overwhelming 
amount of rights by the citizens of the withdrawing state(s) aside (unless 
otherwise negotiated), EU citizenship as such cannot possibly affect, legally 
speaking, the regulation of withdrawals: Article 50 TEU does not contain any 
EU citizenship-related conditions and reading them into the text would not be 
legally sound: 7  EU citizenship is the crucial part of the EU package, the 
                                                                                                                                           
Secession’, in D. Kochenov (ed.), EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights, Cambridge: 
CUP, 2016. 
6 J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Journey to an Unknown Destination: A Retrospective and Prospective of the 
European Court of Justice in the Arena of Political Integration’, 31 Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 1993, 417. 
7 Phoebus Athanassiou and Stéphanie Laulhé Shaelou, ‘EU Citizenship and Its Relevance for EU 
Exit and Secession’, in D. Kochenov (ed.), EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights, 
Cambridge: CUP, 2016. 
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‘fundamental status of the nationals of the Member States’8 in EU law. To 
impose it – and all the supranational law that comes with it – on a people of a 
Member State that has just voted precisely to leave the Union would be an 
aberration of common sense, since it will be a direct attack on the letter and 
purpose of Article 50 TEU, which, ultimately, leaves the precise conditions of 
withdrawal up to negotiators. 
 
This being said, EU citizenship disapplication to the nationals of the 
withdrawing Member State has very far-reaching implications in terms of 
rights which should not be underestimated: a ‘full’ withdrawal would put the 
nationals of the withdrawing state into a worse position than the citizens of 
the third countries benefiting from non-discrimination clauses in the 
agreements with the EU.9 This means that UK citizens in the EU would have a 
legal position inferior to Russians and Moroccans, besides losing all the well-
known perks of EU citizenship ranging from free movement in the EU, non-
discrimination on the basis of nationality within the scope of application of 
EU law, political rights at local and EP level in the country of residence, 
consular protection abroad via the representations of other Member States of 
the EU and others,10 ultimately resulting in the reduction of fundamental 
rights, which are unquestionably connected to the status of EU citizenship.11 
Currently one of the top-quality nationalities in the world, UK citizenship will 
                                                 
8 Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve (C-184/99) [2001] 
E.C.R. I-6193; [2002] 1 C.M.L.R. 19 at [31]. See also, e.g. Baumbast and R. v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department (C-413/99) [2002] E.C.R. I-7091; [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. 23 at [82]; Ruiz 
Zambrano (C-34/09) [2011] 2 C.M.L.R. 46 at [41]. 
9 As we have seen in Simutenkov, such clauses can have direct effect: Case C-265/03 Igor 
Simutenkov [2005] ECLI:EU:C:2005:213. 
10 See Part II TFEU. 
11 E. Sharpston, ‘Citizenship and Fundamental Rights – Pandora’s Box or a Natural Step towards 
Maturity?’, in P. Cardonnel, A. Rosas and N. Wahl (eds.), Consttutionalising the EU Judicial System, 
Oxford: Hart Publishing, 245; D. Kochenov, ‘On Tiles and Pillars: EU Citizenship as a Federal 
Denominator’, in D. Kochenov (ed.), EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights, Cambridge: 
CUP, 2016, 1. 
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drop quite radically in quality after Brexit as a result of the loss of free 
movement rights in 27 Member States.12 
 
Such situation is absolutely bound to have political implications, necessarily 
making the negotiators in charge of arranging the exact agreement behind 
leaving the Union mindful of the far-reaching nature of the losses in terms of 
rights that citizens are likely to experience in the cases of Member State(s) 
leaving. It seems it would be too cynical of the negotiators of the withdrawing 
state to assume that reducing UK citizens residing (or, importantly, wishing 
in the future to reside) in the other Member States to a status inferior to that of 
some third-country nationals with unprivileged relationship with the EU 
would be acceptable, even if this seems to have been the position of the 
British government and the British courts all along. Judges have argued, quite 
astonishingly, that UK citizens residing elsewhere in the EU cannot make a 
claim against disenfranchisement in the withdrawal referendum since they 
will not be more affected by the outcome that UK citizens residing in the 
UK.13 
  
In other words, EU citizenship, while not really a ‘force’ (legally speaking at 
least) in the withdrawal context, is thus bound to play an important role 
politically. The key reason why is very simple: leaving the Union without 
negotiating any arrangement in terms of citizenship rights which would be 
either bilateral with the individual Member States of the EU or EU-oriented, 
                                                 
12 See, for a meticulous methodology of measuring nationality quality applied to all the 
nationalities in the word, D. Kochenov (ed.), The Henley & Partners – Kochenov Quality of 
Nationality Index (1st ed.), Zürich: Ideos, 2016 (www.nationalityindex.org). 
13 The Queen (on the Application of Harry Shindler MBE and Jacquelin MacLennan v. Chancellor of 
the Duchy of Lancaster and the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs) [2016] 
EWCA Civ 469. The UK Supreme Court refused the permission to appeal on the grounds of purely 
UK law, leaving all the EU citizens of UK nationality who resided outside the UK using their EU 
free movement rights for 15 years or more disenfranchised in the Brexit referendum: UKSC 
2016/0105.  
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resembling, for instance, the current framework of free movement of persons 
with Switzerland or the EEA, 14  will definitely result in an almost instant 
drastic free fall in the value of the nationality of the seceding state.15 Post-
secession citizenship will stop providing the holders with full access to the EU 
for work and residence, thus radically diminishing their horizon of 
opportunities, using Sen’s language, 16  when compared with the pre-
withdrawal time. EU citizenship’s core value is precisely in the scale of rights 
which it provides, covering a number of states, rather than one.17 
 
Reducing the scale of rights is bound to derail plenty of lives of those who 
relied on the pre-secession entitlements guaranteed by Part II TFEU, the 
citizenship Part, and EU law more broadly,18 or were likely to benefit from 
such entitlements in the future. Crucially, while the comparison between the 
loss of rights experienced by the citizens of the withdrawing state on the one 
hand and the citizens of the other Member States on the other (so long as free 
movement and other EU-level rights will seize being provided in the territory 
                                                 
14 See The EEA Agreement (OJ 1997 L1/1); EC – Switzerland Agreement (OJ 2002 L114/6). Cf (on 
the EEA regime): Harvard Haukeland Fredriksen, ‘Bridging the Widening Gap Between the EU 
Treaties and the Agreement on the European Economic Area’ (2012) 18 ELJ 868; M Elvira 
Méndez-Pinedo, EC and EEA Law: A Comparative Study of the Effectiveness of European Law 
(Europa Publishing 2009); Carl Baudenbacher (ed), Judicial Protection in the European Economic 
Area (German Law Publishers 2012); Adam Łazowski, ‘Enhanced Multilateralism and Enhanced 
Bilateralism: Integration Without Membership in the European Union’ (2008) 45 CMLRev 1433; 
(on the EU-Swiss Agreement): Steve Peers, ‘The EC-Switzerland Agreement on Free Movement of 
Persons: Overview and Analysis (2000) 2 EuJML 127; Marius Vahl and Nina Grolimund, 
Integration Without Membership: Switzerland’s Bilateral Agreements With the European Union’ 
(CEPS 2006); Francesco Maiani, Roman Petrov, and Ekatarina Mouliarova (eds), ‘European 
Integration Without EU Membership: Models, Experiences, Perspectives’ (2009) EUI Working 
Papers, RSCAS 2009/10, 103–135. 
15 See figure 1 for a graphic representation of the value of the UK nationality before and after the 
possible Brexit based on the Quality of Nationality Index methodology, op cit 
16 See, for the analysis of EU citizenship in such terms, G Palombella, ‘Whose Europe? After the 
Constitution: A Goal-Based Citizenship’ (2005) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 357. 
Cf. A Sen, Development as Freedom (OUP, 1999). 
17 D Kochenov, ‘Member State Nationalities and the Internal Market: Illusions and Reality’, in N. 
Nic Shuibhne and L.W. Gormley (eds.), From Single Market to Economic Union, Oxford: OUP, 2012. 
18 E. Sharpston, ‘Citizenship and Fundamental Rights – Pandora’s Box or a Natural Step towards 
Maturity?’, in P. Cardonnel, A. Rosas and N. Wahl (eds.), Constitutionalising the EU Judicial System, 
Oxford: Hart Publishing, 245. 
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of the withdrawing state) could sound unjustified in terms of the sheer 
difference of scale between the two groups facing the unnecessary reduction 
of rights, it is necessary to take the loss of rights by the remaining EU citizens 
following the point of one state’s withdrawal equally into account. From a 
purely pragmatic point of view it could be presented as a positive 
development, of course, that one is due to lose rights on either side, since 
when both parties are threatened with a loss, a more productive dialogue 
could be said to be more likely. This increases the chances of an amicable 
negotiated solution leading to the minimization of the loss of rights. The 
emphasis on rights is crucial in this respect, since the name of the legal status 
bringing the key rights is a contingency, of course: we can safely assume that 
the political logic of withdrawal under Article 50 TEU would demand 
dropping the pompous ‘citizenship’ label. Core EU citizenship rights can 
easily be provided without, however, to which the current position of 
Switzerland and the EEA countries vis-à-vis the EU clearly testifies.  
 
At this point it is easy to guess the answer that this contribution will offer 
with respect to the key question which looms large in the context of the 
interplay of withdrawals from the Union and EU citizenship. The question is 
whether a dramatic loss of rights by the citizens on both sides of the newly-
emerging EU border is an inevitable follow-up of a withdrawal of a Member 
State from the Union, or, alternatively, could some legal-political tools be 
found to avoid it? This question is obviously a tricky one. Any arrangement 
granting quasi-citizenship of the EU to the citizens of the Member State 
withdrawing from the Union will de facto result in affecting negatively the 
core considerations behind wanting to withdraw – whatever these can be – 
thus openly playing against the objective, which such a withdrawal is seeking 
to achieve. The resulting political balance here can be very tricky: how much 
can real and tangible rights of the withdrawing state’s own citizens be cut in 
Dimitry Kochenov 
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the name of the goals its withdrawal is aiming to achieve (however arcane 
these goals could seem)? This balance will be for the politicians of the 
withdrawing state to try to execute, keeping in mind that maintaining an 
EEA-like arrangement with the EU in the context of the free-movement of 
persons will obviously have a price at the negotiating table. This price will 
necessarily include reciprocal arrangements for EU citizens in the 
withdrawing Member State or other important concessions necessarily and 
obviously limiting the effects of withdrawal from the Union. Besides 
depending on the negotiating position of the other party, such balancing will 
be bound by a full realization that whatever outcome is reached, it is bound to 
disappoint some part of the citizenry, should a ‘true withdrawal’ be 
promised. It comes handy in this regard that the negotiated solution is what 
Article 50 TEU precisely requires. It can thus be safely assumed that leaving 
the EU is not a yes/no question. Moreover, as will be shown below, the Union 
legal history offers a wide palette of examples of a truly far-reaching recourse 
to flexibility in terms of organizing the territorial and substantive reach of its 
law, including within and outside the territory of the Member States. 
 
Choosing a bilateral approach implies potentially significant costs in terms of 
the fragmentation of the current free movement space. Not a surprising 
outcome, one might argue, should the withdrawal decision be taken. While 
negotiating with the remaining Member States collectively will most likely 
make it impossible for the seceding state to discriminate between the 
nationals of the remaining Member States: indeed, they would be prevented 
from adopting such a position in the light of the core principles of EU law, 
bilateral negotiations are likely to be a totally different story. The best meeting 
of minds could easily imply maintaining full free-movement arrangements 
bilaterally only with the Member States where the majority of the expats of 
the withdrawing states reside, plus, perhaps, the most economically 
EU Citizenship and Withdrawals from the Union 
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successful Member States of the EU, thus dropping all but a handful of the 
Member States, arguing that these are anyway of little interest for the citizens 
of the withdrawing Member State in terms of settlement and work 
opportunities. This approach is bound to be put on the table in any bilateral 
setting, given the clear mono-dimensionality of the flows of free movement of 
labour in the EU. It is not that UK citizens are all packing up to go to Slovakia 
or Bulgaria. The contrary is true. Dropping much of Eastern and some of 
Southern EU from the free movement arrangements under the withdrawal 
agreement could thus be presented by the negotiators as a reasonable way 
forward, to strike the right balance between the political goal of secession and 
the need to make sure that own citizens of the seceding state do not suffer a 
really serious blow to their rights.  
 
The consequences for the Eastern European citizens residing in the UK under 
EU law, should such an approach be chosen, could be drastic indeed, a valid 
reason to prefer a strictly multilateral approach and a built-in legal guarantees 
in the final arrangement, against any such bilateral moves in the future. 
Limiting free movement uniquely to the nationals of the richest Member 
States or the Member States where British citizens are most represented is 
obviously a serious blow to the current regime,  excluding the periphery at a 
much more dramatic scale that what is now the case in the context of EU law, 
which tends to favour the centre both structurally and as applied.19   
 
                                                 
19 In its current form the EU is persuasively criticised for not paying attention to the periphery: 
Damjan Kukovec, ‘Taking Change Seriously: The Rhetoric of Justice and the Reproduction of the 
Status Quo’, in Dimitry Kochenov, Gráinne de Búrca and Andrew Williams (eds), Europe’s Justice 
Deficit? (Hart Publishing 2015) 319. The exodus of population from Lithuania or Latvia to the 
West European Member States is thus not necessarily a success of EU’s policy, showing, only, 
how harsh the effects of the economic disparities can be between the Member States and that not 
enough is done to ensure uniform development of all the Member States of the Union: F.G. Nicola, 
‘Conceptions of Justice from Below’, in D. Kochenov, G. de Búrca and A. Williams (eds.), Europe’s 
Justice Deficit?, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015, 349.  
Dimitry Kochenov 
            
9 
Lastly, the number and nature of the possible legal-political issues arising in 
the context of the organization of withdrawals is so large and diverse that this 
brief text can only aspire to touch upon the most important ones, unable to 
provide a truly encyclopædic treatment of this important topic. It is the 
author’s hope, however, that this sketch will nevertheless be helpful for the 
understanding of the core underlying factors influencing the interaction of 
secessions from the Union with EU citizenship. 
 
The analysis proceeds as follows. It first briefly sketches the contours of the 
intimate relationship between citizenship and territory, looking both at the 
national and the supranational levels of this legal relationship. This 
relationship appears to be much less straightforward than what many 
politicians and tabloid writers would like to believe. The argument then 
moves on to demonstrate that the issue of permutations of statehood among 
the Member States of the EU is not as exceptional and rare as the literature 
sometimes tends to assume.20 The Union, however surprising this might seem 
to some, has always been overwhelmingly flexible at its essence. This 
flexibility is bound to manifest itself at its strongest in the context of the 
withdrawal negotiations under Article 50 TEU. Having tapped into the 
history and core building block of the existing tradition of flexibility, this 
contribution puts the emphasis on the consequences of constitutional 
territorial permutations for the enjoyment of supranational rights in the 
Union.  
 
The last section before the concluding question of how to organize the post-
withdrawal free movement of citizens best deals with the political 
                                                 
20 The starting part of this section relies on D. Kochenov and M. van den Brink, ‘Secessions from 
EU Member States: The Imperative of Union’s Neutrality’, Edinburgh School of law Research Paper 
No. 2016/06. 
EU Citizenship and Withdrawals from the Union 
 
10 
implications of the EU citizenship / EU membership story in the context of 
leaving the Union. It is in the realm of the political negotiations, not legal 
battles, as the UK Supreme Court has recently directly confirmed. 21  It is 
fundamental to realise, however, that for the reasons explained above, EU 
citizenship and the rights associated therewith is likely to play the most 
important role in the context of withdrawals from the Union. In terms of the 
limits of the political possibilities the answer is quite simple: anything is 
possible, the preservation of the EEA-like free movement regime between the 
EU and the withdrawing state to the bilateral arrangements between the 
withdrawing state and the Member States of its choice following the 
withdrawal. Cutting any forms of free movement is an extreme, and thus 
politically virtually unfeasible option. Allowing for a broad margin of 
appreciation is particularly sound, given the general context of flexibility of 
citizenship, nationality, territory, and rights arrangements that the EU has to 
offer in the context of constitutional change (including, necessarily, its own). 
A number of important factors is bound to be taken into account as leaving 
the Union is negotiated. A brief comparison will be made with the core (EU) 
citizenship options available to the newly-formed states emerging as a result 
of secessions from the Member States and eager to keep the status of EU 
citizenship for their populations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 UKSC 1016/0105, 24 May 2016. 
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2. Citizenship and territory: an intimate relationship 
 
Citizenship, as ‘an instrument and object of … closure,’22 is naturally and 
intimately connected to territory. This connection is visible in particular 
through some modes of citizenship acquisition that are essentially territorial23 
as well as a usual linkage of citizenship as a legal status of belonging, or a 
mode of contestation, 24  to a particular public authority, which is usually 
territorial in essence.25 Classical understandings of a state in legal literature 
make both citizenship and territory indispensable elements of statehood, 
which necessarily connects the two. Any mutation of the legal status of the 
territory can thus naturally be expected to have consequences for the 
citizenship status of (at least some of) the inhabitants. Crucially, the core right 
of any citizenship relates to the ability to enter the territory the status is 
associated with and remain there free of any border controls – a principle 
recognized in international and EU law.26 
 
EU citizenship, although highly atypical compared with the nationalities at 
the Member State level,27 is nevertheless informed by the same territorial 
                                                 
22 R Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge MA, Harvard 
University Press, 1992), 23. 
23 See, e.g. I. Honohan, ‘The Theory and Politics of Ius Soli’, EUI RSCAS Paper (EUDO Citizenship), 
2010, available at: http://eudo-citizenship.eu/docs/IusSoli.pdf. This crucial legal status is 
distributed in a manner akin to a lottery, where the place of birth and the nationality of parents 
are the two factors at play: Aylet Shachar, Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009. 
24 E.g. Engin Isin, ‘Citizenship in Flux: The Figure of the Activist Citizen’, 29 Subjectivity, 2009, 
367. 
25 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990–1992 (2nd ed.), London: Wiley 
Blackwell, 1992. 
26 C-434/09, McCarthy, EU:C:2011:277, [2011] ECR I-3375. 
27 For overviews, see, e.g. J Shaw, ‘Citizenship: Contrasting Dynamics at the Interface of 
Integration and Constitutionalism’ in P Craig and G de Búrca (eds), Evolution of EU Law (OUP 
2011 2nd ed) 578; D. Kochenov, ‘The Essence of EU Citizenship Emerging from the Last Ten 
Years of Academic Debate’, 62 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2013, 97. 
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logic.28 Its core rights are to be enjoyed in the territory of the Union29 and the 
fundamental rules of its acquisition are also frequently de facto territory-
related: the ius tractum logic of becoming a European citizen – the derivative 
nature of its acquisition 30  – simply relies on the Member States’ own 
determinations of who their nationals are, 31  with only minor derogations 
aiming at the protection of EU-level citizenship rights and the enjoyment of 
supranational personal legal status in full,32 as well as protection of citizens 
against discrimination on the basis of the mode of citizenship acquisition.33 In 
essence, however, any citizenship, including the one of the EU, functions in 
exactly the same way, allowing the polity in charge of the status essentially to 
draw a line between those, who ‘belong’ and those who do not, thus using the 
status to take informed and predictable decisions about the individual 
entitlements of every person holding the status (or not) vis-à-vis the public 
authority.34 
 
                                                 
28 T. Pullano, La citoyenneté européenne: Un espace quasi étatique, Paris: SciencesPo, 2014; L. 
Azoulai, ‘Transfiguring European Citizenship: From Member State Territory to Union Territory’, 
in D. Kochenov (ed.), EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights, Cambridge: CUP, 2016. 
29 Although the Treaty formulation rather points to the sum of the territories of the Member 
States, the concept of the Union territory is maturing very fast in the case-law of the ECJ, playing 
an important role. L. Azoulai, ‘Transfiguring European Citizenship: From Member State Territory 
to Union Territory’, in D. Kochenov (ed.), EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights, 
Cambridge: CUP, 2016. 
30 D. Kochenov, ‘Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and the Difficult Relationship 
between Status and Rights’, (2009) 15 Columbia Journal of European Law 169.   
31 Art. 1, Convention Governing Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationalities, (12 April, 
1930), 179 L.N.T.S. 89, 99. This position is also confirmed by the fact that the Court respects the 
Declarations made by the Member States in clarifying the meaning of their nationalities in the 
context of EU law. See Case C-192/99, Kaur EU:C:2001:106, [2001] ECR I-1237. Cf. A. Sironi, 
‘Nationality of Individuals in Public International Law: A Functional Approach’, in A. Annoni and 
S. Forlati (eds.), The Changing Role of Nationality in International Law (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2014), 54. 
32 Rottmann C-135/08, EU:C:2010:104. For an analysis, see, D. Kochenov, ‘A Real European 
Citizenship: A New Jurisdiction Test; A Novel Chapter in the Development of the Union in Europe’ 
(2011) 18 Columbia Journal of European Law 56, 77. 
33 Case C-214/94 Boukhalfa [1996] ECR I-2253. Similar logic applies to the discrimination based 
on residence outside in a particular territory outside the EU: C-300/4, Eman and Sevinger, 
EU:C:2006:545, [2006] ECRI-8055. Cf. Leonard F.M. Besselink, Annotation of Case C-145/04 Spain 
v. U.K., Case C-300/04 Eman en Sevinger, and ECt.HR Case Sevinger and Eman v. The Netherlands, 
45 CMLRev. 787 (2008). 
34 Christian Joppke, Citizenship and Immigration, Oxford: Polity Press, 2010. 
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This picture is obviously too simplistic to reflect reality in full. While a 
notable connection between citizenship and territory is always there, the two 
function in radically different realms and frequently do not overlap in 
practice. In a metaphor effectively deployed by Rainer Bauböck, if political 
maps of the world would be drawn to show the citizenship of each individual 
in the territory of each of the states, rather than simply colouring state 
territory in a corresponding colour, the resulting picture will be a pixelated 
representation of an intricate reality that will show with clarity how 
citizenship and territory actually do not overlap.35 This is an important point, 
which plenty of thinkers, including T.H. Marshal, ignored: the world is much 
more interesting than what the official statist representations would like to 
make of it.36  
 
When speaking about withdrawals, it is absolutely necessary to have both 
pictures in mind. The dominant one, drawing a clear and idealistic line 
between citizenship and territoriality on the one hand and a less clean 
pixelated world, which Bauböck had in mind, on the other. Importantly, both 
will inform the thinking about the potential influence of citizenship on the 
organization and outcomes of withdrawals of Member States from the Union. 
In other words, citizenship rights, including the core ones, such as voting, can 
have a significant role to play outside the territory,37 while plenty of those 
who are present in the territory will not enjoy the plenitude of rights enjoyed 
                                                 
35 Rainer Bauböck, 'Citizenship and National Identities in the European Union' (1997) Jean 
Monnet Working Paper (Harvard Law School) No. 97/04. 
36 Marshall, T.H., ‘Citizenship and Social Class’, in T.H. Marshall , Citizenship and Social Class. 
London: Pluto Press 1992 [1950]. 
37 Heather Lardy, ‘Citizenship and the Right to Vote’, 17 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 1997, 75; 
Ruth Rubio-Marín, ‘Transnational Politics and the Democratic Nation-State: Normative 
Challenges of Expatriate Voting and Nationality Retention of Emigrants’, 81 New York University 
Law Review, 2006, 117. 
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by the majority of citizens, even though the discrepancies here are thinning 
away very fast.38  
 
Given that EU citizenship is not that different, as a legal status, from the 
nationalities of the Member States from which it derives, it is similarly as non-
territorial in essence, as it is connected to the territory. Crucially, while the 
majority of rights are then only available in the Union as such – including the 
rights to work, to reside, etc. – the possession of the status of citizenship as 
such is non-territorial. The intricate unsustainability of the arrangements 
related to the non-application of EU law in the Færœ Islands in terms of, in 
particular, the personal scope could help to illustrate this basic point. When 
acceding to the Communities the Danish government clarified, that the 
‘Danish nationals in the Færœ Islands’ will not be considered ‘nationals for 
the purposes of Community law’.39 Yet, given that this limitation was merely 
territorial, there is no evidence that it has in any way affected the enjoyment 
of EU citizenship by the Færœ Islanders, as long as they do not travel on the 
green Færœ model of the Danish passport, which they can, but are not 
obliged to request. 40  Any territorial limitation of the status of citizenship 
                                                 
38 Joppke, Christian, ‘The Inevitable Lightening of Citizenship’, 51 Eur. J. Sociology, 2010, 37. 
39 Protocol No. 2 to the Act of Accession, Relating to Færoe Islands, art. 4, 1972 O.J. (L 73) 163. 
The Islands are not part of the Union under Art. 355(5)(a) TFEU. Cf. N. Fagerlund, “Autonomous 
European Island Regions Enjoying a Special 
Relationship with the European Union” in L. Lyck (ed.), Constitutional and Economic Space of the 
Small Nordic Jurisdictions (Copenhagen: NordREFO, 1996), pp.90–112 
40 Færœ Islands is not the only example of a Member State territory that never fell within the 
territorial scope of EU law. Other examples include, inter alia, Macao, Hong Kong (Brian Hook and 
Miguel Santos Neves, ‘The Role of Hong Kong and Macau in China’s Relations with Europe’ (2002) 
169 The China Quarterly 108), Suriname (which decided not to join the Communities when the 
Netherlands Antilles asked to be included as Overseas Countries or Territories (JO 2413/64)), UK 
Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus (SBAs) (Art. 355(5)(b) TFEU; S Lauhlé-Shaelou, ‘The Principle of 
Territorial Exclusion in the EU: SBAs in Cyprus – A Special Case of Sui Generis Territories in the 
EU’ in D Kochenov (ed.), EU Law of the Overseas (Kluwer Law International 2011) 153). Some did 
join at a later stage compared with the ratification of the Treaties by their ‘mother country’. The 
examples include the former Netherlands Antilles (See, de Overeenkomst tot wijziging van het 
Verdrag tot oprichting van de Europese Economische Gemeenschap ten einde de bijzondere 
associeatieregeling van het vierde deel van het Verdrag op de Nederlandse Antillen te doen zijn 
of 13 November 1962, JO 2413/64, 1964) and Canary Islands (See, Council Regulation (EEC) 
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clearly does not work. Moreover, EU law makes clear that some rights of EU 
citizenship which are not territorial per se and can thus be enjoyed outside EU 
territory, such as the general principle of non-discrimination, equally apply to 
all EU citizens of particular nationality residing outside of the territory of the 
EU.41 The same cannot be said of the most important, territorial rights, which 
cannot be enjoyed by EU citizens outside of the territory of the Union, be it in 
the Færœ Islands, Socotra, Aruba, or Koh Samui. 
 
In order to come to a conclusion which right of EU citizenship will be 
operational outside of the Union territory and which not, it is necessary to go 
right by right, conducting individual analysis. It is clear that once a Member 
State withdraws, the majority of supranational rights enjoyed by EU citizens 
in its territory will by definition disappear in thin air, unless otherwise 
negotiated, since the national territory will not anymore make part of the 
territory of the Union. EU law as such cannot possibly limit the principle of its 
own non-application in the territory of the withdrawing state, since there is 
no indication to this effect in Article 50 TEU. There is an important footnote to 
be made here, however: while Article 50 TEU does not make it impossible for 
the Member State willing to withdraw to abandon all of the acquis of the 
Union – indeed, this is what ‘withdrawal’ means when approached purely 
linguistically – questions are bound to arise, should the withdrawing state be 
willing to retroactively terminate the rights enjoyed by EU citizens connected 
with other Member States in its own territory. Ratione temporis of the law will 
be of crucial importance. It is absolutely clear that an argument that their 
rights simply expire will not hold, since withdrawal cannot possibly amount 
to a retroactive annulment of all the EU law-inspired national legislation and 
                                                                                                                                           
1911/91 of 26 June 1991 on the application of the provisions of Community law to the Canary 
Islands, OJ L [1991] 171/1). 
41 C-300/4, Eman and Sevinger, EU:C:2006:545, [2006] ECRI-8055. 
EU Citizenship and Withdrawals from the Union 
 
16 
regulations. In the case of the UK this means that the EU Citizens Free 
Movement Directive, as implemented in national law, will no doubt continue 
applying until the time it is expressly overruled. Moreover, such overruling 
will have to comply with the national constitutional requirements of legal 
certainty, the protection of human rights and the rule of law. The same 
applies to countless other instruments. Arguing to the contrary would imply 
arguing for a complete chaos supplanting the law, given the depth of the 
interpenetration of national and European at this stage.  In other words, the 
drastic consequences of withdrawals for the rights of EU citizens, while 
absolute for those who have not used those rights yet, are in all likelihood 
somewhat tamed in the case of those who already reside across the newly-
emerging EU border. Ultimately, however, this issue is bound to be one of the 
core aspects of the political negotiations under Article 50 TEU.  
 
Unlike the non-application of EU law and rights to the territory of the 
seceding state post-secession, the contrary is true with regard to the status of 
EU citizenship: all those holding EU citizenship acquired on the basis of a 
connection with any of the Member States but the withdrawing one will keep 
their status and will be able to enjoy the plenitude of rights connected to it, 
once returning to the territory of the Union (while being able to enjoy non-
territorial rights in the withdrawing state itself). This very basic 
understanding is behind the rising numbers of UK citizens wishing to acquire 
an Irish nationality, to which many of them are entitled by law.42  
 
 
 
                                                 
42 The Irish are not even foreigners in the UK, under UK law: Electoral Administration Act, 2006, 
c. 22, § 18(1)(b) (Eng.); Representation of People Act, 2000, c. 2, § 6(3)(e) (Eng.). 
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3. The tradition of EU flexibility in dealing with territorial 
and citizenship changes 
 
Recent European constitutional history teaches us the lesson of flexibility of 
the legal arrangements in many of the cases when the boundaries of territory 
and belonging have been redrawn and the status of citizenship, including the 
ability to benefit from supranational rights, has been affected. This flexibility 
definitely includes EU law and international law: from citizenship rules, 
where the EU simply follows pretty much any approach adopted nationally,43 
to adaptations to the unique circumstances of each particular case: Estonia 
and Latvia refusing to recognize large shares of their population based on the 
state territory as citizens, triggering EU-level non-recognition of their EU-
level rights claims,44 just as the adaptations of the pre-accession regime to 
accept divided Cyprus, in ephemeral control of the island, including full EU 
citizenship for the Turkish Cypriots qualifying for the status under the law of 
the Republic although residing in the occupied territories,45 are the cases in 
point. These lessons should be taken into account in full while interpreting 
the limits of the Treaties in dealing with secessions, withdrawals and 
accessions: both the understandings of ‘citizenship’ and that of ‘territory of a 
Member State’ are malleable.46 In the context of withdrawals from the EU this 
                                                 
43 EU law honours the Member States’ determinations, for instance, of nationality for the 
purposes of EU law, which implies that non-nationals of the Member States could be considered 
EU citizens and vice versa, some nationals could be considered non-EU citizens. The German and 
the UK approaches to citizenship are particular cases in point, both tolerated by EU law: Case C-
192/99, The Queen v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t ex parte Manjit Kaur, 2001 E.C.R. I-1237, 
para. 27.  
44 For a detailed analysis of this particular issue, see, e.g., Dimitry Kochenov and Alekseijs 
Dimitrovs, ‘EU Citizenship for the Latvian “Non-Citizens”: A Concrete Proposal’ (2016) 37 
Houston Journal of International Law 1. 
45 Elena Basheska and Dimitry Kochenov, ‘Thanking the Greeks: The Crisis of the Rule of Law in 
EU Enlargement Regulation’ (2015) 39 Southeastern Europe 392. 
46 Numerous other examples can be given, ranging from special treatment of the belonger status 
of the Åland Islands to Saami agriculture protocols and the limited EU citizenship rights of 
Manxmen and the Channel Islanders aimed at the preservation of their autonomy and specificity. 
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would not amount to much, however, besides making the EU tolerate a more 
extensive policy of naturalization of the citizens of the withdrawing state by 
other Member States of the Union, like the Irish-British example referred to 
above.47 Very much can be done in terms of framing national citizenship of a 
Member State and connecting or, eventually, disconnecting it from the EU 
citizenship status, as the practice shows.48 All in all, regrettably, one can state 
that more than twenty years of EU citizenship practice49 have not altered the 
day-to-day reality of nationalism and harmful and irrational citizenship 
regulation in Europe. Citizenship wars rage in the East of the continent – with 
the latest example coming from Slovakia, eager to deprive of its nationality its 
own citizens of Hungarian ethnicity willing to accept Hungarian nationality;50 
                                                                                                                                           
See, on the Isle of man and Channel Islands UK citizenship status and EU rights: Documents 
Concerning the Accession to the European Communities of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, the 
Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Protocol No. 
3, Mar. 27, 1972, 1972 O.J. (L 73) 164; see also K.R. Simmonds, The British Islands and the 
Community: I—Jersey, 6 CMLRev. 156 (1969); K.R. Simmonds, The British Islands and the 
Community: II—The Isle of Man, 7 CMLRev. 454 (1970); K.R. Simmonds, The British Islands and 
the Community: III—Guernsey, 8 CMLRev. 475 (1971); On the Åland Islands belonger status: D. 
Kochenov, ‘Regional Citizenships and EU Law’, 35 ELRev. 2010, 307; N. Fagerlund, “Chapter 9: 
The Special Status of the Åland Islands in the European Union” in Lauri Hannikainen and Frank 
Horn (eds), Autonomy and Demilitarisation in International Law: The Åland Islands in a Changing 
Europe (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), p.189On the Saami territoria/legal status 
arrangements: Perrot and Miatti, “Les lapons et les îles Åland dans le quatrième élargissement” 
(1997) 413 Revue du marché commun et de l’Union européenne 670, 
47 There is a consensus in the literature that naturalising excessively large numbers of people at 
once could amount to a breach of EU law due to possible negative externalities for the other 
Member States. The exact threshold to understand when this rule is applicable is relatively high, 
however. Even naturalising 1.000.000 foreigners abroad over ten years, as Italy has done in 
Argentina, seems to be fully legal and has not caused any criticism, while smaller scale 
naturalisations in Bulgaria (as applied to Macedonians) and Romania (as applied to Moldovans) 
not infrequently receive negative press, supplying a clear example of dual standards in the EU. 
Given that a million per ten years is clearly acceptable, however, one could doubt if Ireland, in 
one example, could naturalise all the willing population of the UK without breaching EU law. 
Important in this context is that the ECJ consistently ignores involuntary naturalisations: Case 
21/74, Jeanne Airola v. Comm’n [1975[ E.C.R. 221. 
48 The ability to disconnect Member State nationality from EU citizenship, although confirmed in 
Kaur, is much more difficult for the Member States to use after Rottmann, which is a positive 
development, as it reduces the likelihood of invoking the right to bring unilateral declarations on 
the meaning of nationality for the purposes of EU law by the Member States wishing to deprive of 
rights certain minority groups among their citizens.  
49 A. Wiener, ‘Going Home? “European” Citizenship Practice Twenty Years after’, in D. Kochenov 
(ed.), EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights, Cambridge: CUP, 2016. 
50 Jose-Maria Araiza, ‘Good Neighbourliness as the Limit of Extra-territorial Citizenship: The Case 
of Hungary and Slovakia’, in Dimitry Kochenov and Elena Basheska (eds), Good Neighbourliness in 
the European Legal Context (Brill-Nijhoff 2015). 
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at a more general level, and notwithstanding the global trends,51 multiple 
nationality is not yet accepted everywhere across the EU. Limitations can 
apply even to the cumulation of Member State nationalities.52 
 
Such negative examples notwithstanding, it is beyond any doubt that EU’s 
citizenship and territorial evolution has been particularly eventful over the 
last half a century. More than half of what used to be the founding Member 
States’ territory has left their sovereignty since the creation of the European 
Communities.53 Moreover, a significant number of the Member States of the 
EU are direct products of recent permutations of statehood, some of them 
gaining statehood with the clear support of the Union.54 The same applies to 
some candidate countries. 55  Constitutional permutations of territory and, 
consequently, of citizenship, are thus quite common in the European context. 
                                                 
51 P. Spiro, At Home in Two Countries: The Past and Future of Dual Citizenship, New York, NY: NYU 
Press, 2016. 
52 D. Kochenov, ‘Double Nationality in the EU: An Argument for Tolerance’, 17 ELJ, 2011, 323. 
53 Besides of course Algeria which was fully incorporated into the French Republic at the 
inception of the Communities and the Netherlands East Indies and New Guinea, the Member 
States possessed a variety of territories around the world and it was not the intention of the 
Communities to let these territories go. Indeed, their incorporation into the internal market in 
the mid- to long-term future was a crucial condition for the French participation in the European 
integration project: D Custos, ‘Implications of the European Integration for the Overseas’ in D 
Kochenov (ed), EU Law of the Overseas (Kluwer Law International 2011) 91. Following Ziller’s 
helpful compilation, the Member States’ territories then included: the Belgian territories of Congo 
and Rwanda-Burundi, Italian protectorate of Somalia, to the Netherlands New Guinea, and to the 
French equatorial Africa (Côte-d’Ivoire, Dahomey, Guinea, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Sudan, and 
Upper Volta), French East Africa (Moyen-Congo (the future Central African Empire beloved by 
Giscard d’Estaing), Gabon, Oubangui-Chari and Chad), protectorates Togo and Cameroon, 
Comoros Islands (Mayotte, separated from them is now an outermost region of the EU), 
Madagascar, Côte Française des Somalis. Following the UK accession, the list of the associated 
countries and territories became much longer, including (besides the countries and territories 
still on the list) Bahamas, Brunei, Caribbean Colonies and Associated States (Antigua, Dominica, 
Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Anguilla, British Honduras), Gilbert and 
Ellis Islands, Line Islands, the Anglo-French Condominium of the New Hebrides, Solomon Islands, 
and Seychelles. J Ziller, ‘L’Union européenne et l'outre-mer’, 113 Pouvoirs 145, 146–47 (2005). 
54 Which is attested, for instance, by the work of the Badinter Commission: Frank Hoffmeister, 
‘The Contribution of EU Practice to International Law’ in Marise Cremona (ed), Developments in 
EU External Relations Law (OUP 2008). 
55 In one example, it was due to the EU’s efforts that a deal laying down the rules of the 
Montenegrin independence referendum was brokered between the pro- and anti-independence 
movements. Following EU recommendations, it was decided that for independence to be gained, 
a 55% majority was required. For a detailed analysis of the negotiations see: Karsten Friis, ‘The 
Referendum in Montenegro: The EU’s “Postmodern Diplomacy” (2007) 12 European Foreign 
Affairs Review 67.  
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The problems which secessions pose to citizenship at the national level56 are 
very similar to the problems posed by withdrawals from the EU in the context 
of EU citizenship at the supranational level. Both levels clearly enjoy both 
elements of the citizenship / territory equation, even if the supranational level 
is somewhat more complex due to the constant reliance on the determinations 
of territoriality and also citizenship made by the constituent parts of the 
Union – the Member States – under their own law. This being said, also the 
contrary could be said to be true: in the case of withdrawals from the EU the 
nationality of the population of the withdrawing entity is already clearly 
predetermined by its own constitutional law, which is not the case when 
states split. In other words, while the EU situation is relatively more complex, 
when compared to the splitting of states, it is at the same time also simpler, 
since there is no need, in the context of the secessions from the EU, to 
articulate an entirely new status of citizenship.  
 
Since history knows no examples of withdrawals from the EU – and those 
who cite Greenland are obviously wrong, since it is still part of an EU 
Member State and Parts IV, II, and many other provisions of TFEU (to say 
nothing about secondary law) applies there, so Greenland has never ‘left’,57 – 
it is most logical to approach secessions from the Member States as a parallel 
to the story of possible withdrawals from the Union. After all, a full secession 
– not a half-way devolution, like in the case of Greenland or St Pierre-et-
                                                 
56 See Jo Shaw’s chapter in Carlos Closa (ed.), Troubled Membership: Dealing with Secession from a 
Member State and Withdrawal from the Union, CUP, 2017 (forthcoming). 
57  Treaty amending, with regard to Greenland, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities [1985] OJ L 29/1 (The Greenland Treaty); Friedl Weiß, ‘Greenland’s Withdrawal 
from the European Communities’ (1985) 10 European Law Review 173. ‘Leaving’ is not a correct 
characterisation of this treaty’s key legal effect: Greenland simply changed its status under the 
Treaties, becoming an Overseas Country or Territory in the sense of Annex II, which means that a 
lot of EU law applied there. 
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Miquelon58 – necessarily results in a full disapplication of supranational law 
to the territory in question, including the provisions on the personal legal 
status recognized by the supranational legal level. This is exactly the 
maximum outcome of any withdrawal under Article 50 TEU. In this sense, 
taking Article 50 TEU seriously to heart – as a lawyer should – will produce 
the result akin to Algeria’s withdrawal from the EEC as a result of leaving 
France – all the Algerians losing the status of Member State nationals for the 
purposes of Community law as a result of this move. 59  
 
The example of Algeria is both exceptional and not. Although not 
characterized as a colony in French law, legitimate claims can be made that de 
facto it was one, thus joining the chorus of other colonial possessions, leaving 
the sovereignty of their ‘mother countries’ and also cutting citizenship ties 
with the Member State in question and with the EEC. Remember the 
Eurafrican Union 60  and look at the contemporary maps: from Vanuatu to 
Congo, from Somalia and Suriname, European sovereignty has receded, 
bringing with it new, local, citizenship statuses for the majority of the former 
colonial subjects of different kinds, some of them enjoying full citizenship of 
                                                 
58 France claimed to have changed the status of the territory unilaterally on a number of 
occasion. It is not entirely clear whether such unilateral change (which was entirely in line with 
the Treaty text at the time) actually resulted in a difference in treatment vis-à-vis the 
Communities. The Commission claimed it did: Written Question No. 400/76 by Mr. Lagorce to the 
Commission concerning the situation of the islands Saint-Pierre-and-Miquelon [1976] OJ C 
294/16, para. 1. 
59 Algeria was fully incorporated first following the formation of the Second Republic (1848). Guy 
Pervillé, ‘La politique algérienne de la France, de 1830 à 1962’ (1997) 32 Le Genre humain 27; P 
Laffont, Histoire de la France en Algérie (Plon 1979). 
60 Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson, ‘Building Eurafrica: Reviving Colonialism through European 
Integration, 1920-60’ in Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Berny Sebe and Gabrielle Maas (eds), Echoes of 
Empire: Identity, Memory, and Colonial Legacies (I.B. Tauris 2015); Peo Hansen and Stefan 
Jonsson, Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism (Bloomsbury 
Academic 2014); Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson, ‘Bringing Africa as a “Dowry to Europe”: 
European Integration and the Eurafrican Project’ (2011) 13 Interventions 443; Peo Hansen and 
Stefan Johnsson, ‘Imperial Origins of European Integration and the Case of Eurafrica: A Reply to 
Gary Marks’ “Europe and Its Empires”’, (2012) 50 JCMS 1028; D Custos, ‘Implications of the 
European Integration for the Overseas’ in D Kochenov (ed), EU Law of the Overseas (Kluwer Law 
International 2011) 91.  
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the European metropoles. The sovereign territories of the majority of the 
founding Member States of the Union have shrunk in the most radical 
fashion.61  
 
Turning to Europe proper, a simple glance at the statehood of the current 
Member States suffices to make a basic point: mutations of statehood  are 
responsible for the creation / consolidation of a number of the Member States 
of the EU, from the decolonization context spurring Malta and Cyprus into 
existence to the regaining of statehood by the Baltic States,62 the split between 
the Czech and the Slovak Republics,63 and the articulation of Slovenia and 
Croatia, as well as the united Germany, following the incorporation of the 
German Democratic Republic (DDR) and Berlin (West) into the Federal 
Republic,64 and France, with Algeria leaving. Crucially, the EU, as well as its 
individual Member States, played an important role in bringing about such 
mutations of statehood not only with regard to the entities which came to be 
                                                 
61 Germany, of course, is the most radical counter-example: Treaty on the Establishment of 
German Unity art. 1, Aug. 31, 1990, 30 I.L.M 457 (1991); Michael Bothe, ‘The German Experience 
to Meet the Challenges of Reunification’ in Alfred E Kellerman and others (eds), EU Enlargement: 
The Constitutional Impact at EU and National Level  (Asser 2011); Eberhard Grabitz, ‘L’unité 
allemande et l’intégration européenne’ (1991) 27 Cahiers de Droit Européen 3; Jean-Paul Jacqué, 
‘L’unification de l’Allemagne et la Communauté européenne’ (1990) 94 Revue générale de droit 
internationale public 997. 
62 For a meticulous analysis, see Peter Van Elsuwege, From Soviet Republics to EU Member States 
(Martinus Nijhoff 2008). See also: Ineta Ziemele, State Continuity and Nationality: The Baltic 
States and Russia – Past, Present and Future as Defined by International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 
2005); Alekseijs Dimitrovs and Vadim Poleshchuk, ‘Kontinuitet kak osnova gosudarstvennosti i 
ètnopolitiki v Latvii i Èstonii’ in Vadim Poleshchuk and Valery Stepanov (eds), Ètnopolitika stran 
Baltii (Nauka 2013). 
63 For an overview of the legal implications of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, see, Martin 
Palous, ‘Questions of Czech Citizenship’ in André Liebich and Daniel Warner with Jasna Dragovic 
(eds), Citizenship East and West (Routledge 1995) 142. Specifically on the issues of citizenship: D. 
Kochenov, ‘EU Influence on the Citizenship Policies of the Candidate Countries: The Case of the 
Roma Exclusion in the Czech Republic’, 3 JCER 2007, 124. For the general assessment of 
secessions in the context of the East-European eruption of state-making, see, Cass R Sunstein, 
‘Constitutionalism and Secession’ (1991) 58 University of Chicago Law Review 633. 
64 RW Piotrowicz, The Status of Germany in International Law: Deutschland über Deutschland?’ 
(1989) 38 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 609. 
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Member States,65 but also other countries, including loose protectorates that 
the EU has created.66 
 
Splitting up of the colonial empires, besides triggering the creation of new 
states,67 produced large numbers of foreigners deprived of EU-level rights out 
of full citizens able to benefit from what European integration had to offer.68 
The developments here were not straight-forward. Some of the newly-
emerging foreigners lost EU citizenship69 even without losing their nationality 
of a Member State sensu lato, as was the case with Mrs Kaur, whose Member 
State nationality was considered by the Court as not good enough to consider 
her an EU citizen.70 Others lost all the rights without losing the status of 
                                                 
65 Frank Hoffmeister, ‘The Contribution of EU Practice to International Law’ in Marise Cremona 
(ed), Developments in EU External Relations Law (OUP 2008). 
66 On the role of the EU in Kosovo see: Wolfgang Koeth, ‘State Building without a State: The EU’s 
Dilemma in Defining Its Relations with Kosovo’ (2010) 15 European Foreign Affairs Review 227; 
Stephen Rozée, ‘Order-Maintenance in Kosovo: The EU as an Increasingly Comprehensive Police 
Actor?’ (2015) 20 European Foreign Affairs Review 97; Spyros Economides and James Ker-
Lindsay, ‘Forging EU Policy Unity from Diversity: The “Unique Case” of the Kosovo Status Talks’ 
(2010) 15 European Foreign Affairs Review 495. For Bosnia see: Anze Voh Bostic, ‘The Role of 
the European Union’s Expert Assistance in the Process of Peace-Building: The Case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’ (2010) 15 European Foreign Affairs Review 209; Milada Anna Vachudova, ‘The 
Thieves of Bosnia: The Complicated Legacy of the Dayton Peace Accords’ (2014) Foregin Affairs. 
Available at < https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2014-02-24/thieves-bosnia> 
(last visited 28-09-2015). 
67 Poul Kjær, Constitutionalism in the Global Realm: A Sociological Approach (Routledge 2014). 
68 Similarly, but following strictly territorial logic, former colonies graduating into statehood fell 
outwith the scope of European human rights instruments: A Hallo de Wolf, ‘The Application of 
Human Rights Treaties in Overseas Countries and Territories’ in D Kochenov (ed), EU Law of the 
Overseas (Kluwer Law International 2011). 
69 Rather than EU citizenship sensu stricto, what was at stake, was its precursor status, making 
part of the ‘informal resources of the acquis’ (A. Wiener, ‘European’ Citizenship Practice – Building 
Institutions of a Non-State (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998). This status was ‘nationals of the 
Member States for the purposes of Community law’ and predated the formal introduction of EU 
citizenship at Maastricht. The ECJ could distinguish between the two, by making EU citizenship 
more inclusive through depriving the Member States of the possibility they enjoyed in the pre-
citizenship legal context to limit its scope via unilateral declarations – a practice much criticized 
in the academic literature of the day: R. Plender, ‘An Incipient Form of European Citizenship’ in F. 
Jacobs (ed.), EU Law and the Individual (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1976). The ECJ has not done 
this, however, tacitly reaffirming the legality of the unilateral British declarations on the scope of 
UK nationality for the purposes of community law and potentially opening the door for further 
such limitations of the term ‘nationals’ in Article 9 TEU: Case C-192/99, Manjit Kaur [2001] ECR. 
I-1237. 
70 Case C-192/99, Manjit Kaur [2001] ECR. I-1237. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see, e.g., 
D. Kochenov, ‘Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and the Difficult Relationship 
between Status and Rights’ 15 Columbia J. Eur. L., 2009, 169, at 186–190. 
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citizenship due to the racist immigration policies adopted by the Member 
States of the EU,71 or, on the contrary, did not lose any EU rights at all, while 
de jure losing EU citizenship, as is the case with Færœ islanders (or its 
precursor status). 
 
Numerous key EU citizenship cases deal with the persons, who, having 
enjoyed full entitlements to supranational rights since their birth, lost those 
overnight, as ‘their’ country became independent of a Member State, thus 
depriving them of the ‘legal heritage’72 connection with the EU. Looking neat 
in legal literature, such cases often feed on human tragedy, separated families, 
and sadness: Morson and Jhanjan would be a case in point: a failed attempt to 
invoke EU law to secure family reunification between the individuals who all 
used to be Member State nationals a short while before, thus free of border 
controls, their situation changing radically with the independence of 
Suriname.73  
 
The ECJ’s and ECHR’s approaches to the personal histories of EU citizenship 
(or a predecessor status) are drastically different.74 For the ECt.HR your past 
at times lingers on as (possibly) legally relevant, like the former Netherlands 
nationality of ‘an illegal migrant’ from Suriname, residing with her Dutch 
family in the Netherlands in the case of Jeunesse v. The Netherlands.75 The ECJ – 
                                                 
71 Anthony Lester, Lord Lester of Herne Hill QC, Lecture, East African Asians Versus the United 
Kingdom: The Inside Story (Oct. 23, 2003), available at 
http://www.blackstonechambers.com/document.rm?id=73. 
72 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1. 
73 Joined cases 35 and 36/82, Morson and Jhanjan [1982] ECR 3723. 
74 S. Adam and P. Van Elsuwege, ‘EU Citizenship and the European Federal Challenge through the 
Prism of Family Reunification’, in D. Kochenov (ed.), EU Citizenship and Federalism, The Role of 
Rights, Cambridge: CUP, 2016. 
75 E.g. ECt.HR Jeunesse v. The Netherlands Application no. 12738/10, 3 Oct. 2014; ECt.HR Beldjoudi 
v. France Application no. 12083/86, 26 March 1992. For an insightful comment on Jeunesse in the 
context of EU law, see, S. Adam and P. Van Elsuwege, ‘EU Citizenship and the European Federal 
Challenge through the Prism of Family Reunification’, in D. Kochenov (ed.), EU Citizenship and 
Federalism, The Role of Rights, Cambridge: CUP, 2016. 
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just as the Member State courts – would usually ignore such past, including 
past nationalities, entirely, declaring yesterday’s citizens illegal aliens without 
a blink of an eye.76 While legally correct, this approach is clearly problematic, 
especially in the context of the general move from ‘the culture of authority’ to 
the ‘culture of justification’.77 The global trend in law nowadays is seeing a 
person behind the impenetrable and simplistic legal façade of citizenship.78 
Seeing a person indispensably implies being capable of taking the personal 
history into account, not only the passport the person happens to be travelling 
on. 
 
Two important lessons from the above emerge. Firstly, mutations of 
statehood are not exceptional – secessions from states have been a day-to-day 
reality in 20th century Europe and the story continues into the 21st century. In 
this context withdrawal from the EU will be but one example among many. 
Indeed, many of the secession examples are sad ones in essence, bringing 
about the quality of life and the level of security far below the time of the 
proclamation of statehood. Besides the ‘normality’ of secessions and territorial 
fluctuations as testified by their commonality and omnipresence, secondly, 
history teaches us also the lesson of flexibility of the legal arrangements in 
many of these cases. This fully includes citizenship arrangements. Although 
examples of territories leaving the sovereign ambit of the Member States and 
                                                 
76 There is a consensus in the literature that the ECJ does not have the most enviable record of 
the protection of the rights of EU citizens, particularly those who are in vulnerable position: N. 
Nic Shuibhne, ‘(Some of) The Kids Are All Right: Comment on McCarthy and Dereci’, 49 CMLRev., 
2012, 349; E. Spaventa ‘Earned Citizenship – Understanding Union Citizenship through Its Scope’, 
in D. Kochenov (ed.), EU Citizenship and Federalism, The Role of Rights, Cambridge: CUP, 2016; C. 
O’Brien, ‘Union Citizenship and Disability’, in D. Kochenov (ed.), EU Citizenship and Federalism, 
The Role of Rights, Cambridge: CUP, 2016.  
77 M. Cohen-Eliya and I. Porat, Proportionality and Constitutional Culture, Cambridge: CUP, 2013. 
See also Tully, James, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity, Cambridge: 
CUP, 1995 (on the inherent problems of constitutionalism in the context of diversity). 
78 L Bosniak, ‘Persons and Citizens in Constitutional Thought’ (2010) 8 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 9; L Azoulai, ‘L’autonomie de l’individu européen et la question du statut’ 
(2013) EUI LAW Working Paper 2013/14. 
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withdrawing from the realm of (potential) application of EU law are 
numerous, not a single clear-cut example of a state withdrawing from the 
Union has been recorded. It is good news, however, thus such an example is 
entirely unnecessary to come to a definitive conclusion of what will happen 
with the EU citizenship of the nationals of the withdrawing state. This status 
will simply expire and seize to exist for them. No persuasive argument exists 
to allow this legal status to function as a legal pretext to deprive Article 50 
TEU of effet utile besides depriving the people of the withdrawing Member 
State of a possibility to decide, by democratic means, that they do not want 
EU membership anymore. EU citizenship will go with the whole package. 
Withdrawal means leaving the ambit of the law of the Union and in this sense 
it will be no different from British Honduras leaving the UK or Java leaving 
the Netherlands.  
 
 
4. Political dilemmas 
 
Even though EU citizenship clearly cannot play a distinct role in the context 
of the practical application of Article 50 TEU, by providing legal argument 
against withdrawals resulting in the abolition of EU citizenship rights for the 
nationals of the withdrawing state, the considerations related to the 
supranational rights and status are bound to play an important role in the 
context of the withdrawal negotiations. While EU’s history of dealing with 
citizenship and territory issues in the context of the deterioration of the 
colonial empires and the transformation of the Balkans as well as the Central 
and Eastern European countries show that the Union can be very flexible in 
trying to accommodate the specificity of the particular territories of its 
Member States, the context of the withdrawal negotiations could prove 
Dimitry Kochenov 
            
27 
somewhat different from the previous practice. This difference is due to the 
fact that EU citizenship is clearly not an autonomous status at the level of 
acquisition, numerous scholarly 79  and institutional 80  calls for change 
notwithstanding. Not being able to confer autonomous supranational level 
citizenship, the EU’s room for manœuvre in dealing with the wholesale loss of 
rights by the citizens of the withdrawing Member State is somewhat 
restrained, unless the Member States would be willing to change the Treaties 
to allow for an exceptional provision of full EU citizenship, or merely some 
rights associated therewith, for the nationals of the withdrawing state. The 
likelihood of this is nihil, however, as the reasons for such an action on the 
part of the Herren der Verträge are not crystal clear. An alternative, and more 
general reform, implying turning EU citizenship into a truly independent 
status at the level of acquisition and loss is probably not politically viable at 
the moment, just as it was not since the Treaty of Maastricht. 
In a situation where such an independent supranational level status could be 
created, an array of legal options at hand would be significant, including, but 
not limited to four main options, tailored to ensure that the citizens of the 
withdrawing state do not lose supranational rights. This contribution is not 
the place to advocate for the creation of an autonomous status of 
supranational belonging. We should realize, however, that however 
improbable, it would be too much to say that it is legally or politically 
impossible. 
 
                                                 
79 E.g. D Kostakopoulou, ‘European Union Citizenship and Member State Nationality: Updating or 
Upgrading the Link’ in J Shaw (ed), Has the European Court of Justice Challenged the Member 
State Sovereignty in Nationality Law? (EUI Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Paper 
No 62 (2011)). 
80 E.g., most recently, European Economic and Social Committee, ‘Opinion on a More Inclusive 
Citizenship Open to Immigrants (own-initiative opinion)’, Rapporteur Pariza Castaños, SOC/479, 
16 October 2013: ‘The Committee proposes that, in future, when the EU undertakes a new report 
of the Treaty (TFEU), it amends Article 20 so that third-country nationals who have stable, long-
term resident status can also become EU citizens’ (para. 1.11). 
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1. Dual nationality of the EU and the withdrawing state. With the global rise 
of multiple nationality toleration, where dual nationality is not frowned 
upon in the majority of jurisdictions around the world, a combination of 
two nationalities could be the way forward, ensured by a legal 
arrangement that will allow independent EU citizenship not to expire for 
the nationals of the withdrawing Member State upon the departure of 
such state from the Union. Given that EU citizenship is not an 
independent status, however, this option is not applicable, without a 
serious reform of the law, unless one (or several) of the Member States 
wishes to naturalise all the citizens of the withdrawing state, which could 
be highly problematic from the point of view of EU law as discussed 
above; 
 
2. Common nationality shared by the EU and the withdrawing state. This is 
an advanced variation on the previous option, the plausibility of which is 
weak for the same reason, which does not make this option impossible In 
fact, plenty of entities in the world share some variation of an 
arrangement of this kind. It is particularly favoured by the semi-
independent entities, which the UK will most likely end-up being as an 
outcome of the secession negotiations, given the high costs or a total 
refusal to associate itself with the EU acquis and the internal market. All 
the Arubans are in fact Dutch citizens, just as all the Niueans are New 
Zealanders. 
 
3. The elevation of the nationality of the withdrawing state to the rank of an 
associated nationality of the EU. Examples of associated states offering 
own nationality to their citizens in a legal context where that nationality 
in fact equals, in a number of core respects, the main nationality with 
which the state is associated are rather common. Federated States of 
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Micronesia nationality, in one example, entitles the bearer to home 
treatment and non-discrimination in the US, with which state the 
Federated States are associated.81 Associated nationalities are usually acts 
of benevolence on the part of more potent states. In the context of the EU 
the recognition of the nationality of the withdrawing state as an 
associated nationality would most likely require a Treaty change, or at 
least a common declaration by the remaining Member States. Given that 
the majority of rights enjoyed by EU citizens, including, most 
importantly, free movement, are territorial in nature, and, knowing that 
the territory of the withdrawing state will not be part of EU territory for 
the purposes of such rights, it would be unclear why the Member States 
of the EU should take any such benevolent steps knowing that the 
territory of the withdrawing Member State will be off limits for EU 
citizens. This is an obvious opportunity to be used, however, since the UK 
government can obviously extend rights to EU nationals similarly to how 
it treats the citizens of the Republic of Ireland. 
 
4. Lastly, and this option does not imply the creation of a truly independent 
EU citizenship status, an international agreement can be concluded 
between the withdrawing state and the EU and its Member States aiming 
at ensuring that free movement rights enjoyed by the nationals of all the 
parties involved, continue beyond the point of the state’s withdrawal. 
This option, which could be part of a larger EEA-like framework created 
by the parties, will however clearly undermine the effect of withdrawal 
and could therefore not be fully politically viable, unless the withdrawal 
is officially triggered by the reasons unrelated to the issues of free 
                                                 
81 T. Lam Dang, ‘Relation associative: les États Fédérés de Micronésie: les spécificités de 
l’association’, in Jean-Yves Faberon et al. (eds.), Destins des collectivités politiques d’Océanie, Vol 
1, Marseille: Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille, 2011. 
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movement and the management of the migration flows within the EU, 
which is not the case in the UK, in one crucial example. 
 
The four options above will most likely not be politically viable both in 
practice (as they will require a Treaty change, or negotiating agreements de 
facto cancelling the effects of withdrawal from the EU) and in theory (as they 
assume that citizens voting for withdrawal want to remain EU citizens 
nevertheless – even if not in a name). In other words, these options will, in all 
likelihood, not be acceptable to the parties. 
 
This does not change the fact that plenty of outstanding problems caused by a 
Member State’s withdrawal from the EU will need to be solved nevertheless. 
The solutions to such problems will necessarily need to imply taking the wish 
of the people of the withdrawing state precisely to withdraw seriously. The 
most viable among these, could be the negotiation of bilateral free movement 
of persons agreements between the withdrawing state and a handful of 
Member States. Such agreements will, however, approach member state 
nationals in their national status capacity and will thus not be concerned with 
EU citizenship as such. 
 
 
5. Post-secession free movement bilateralism? 
 
Any withdrawal from the EU offers its authors and their compatriots an 
uneasy dilemma. Any full withdrawal automatically leads to a radical 
downgrading in the value of the nationality of the withdrawing state 
approached through the prism of the amount and the scale of rights such a 
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nationality is associated with. The amount of difficulty (and, possibly, human 
suffering) such an arrangement can cause is very difficult to ignore in the 
context of the negotiations. Yet, no EU citizenship arguments as such could 
change the fate of the negotiating outcomes, as Article 50 TEU cannot be 
interpreted contra legem. Consequently, should Britain leave the EU, for 
instance, every British citizen in France, Poland, Spain and elsewhere in the 
Union (and there are hundreds of thousands of them) will instantly see a 
rights’ downgrade to the level of Indian, Chilean or Russian citizens residing 
in the Union. Should the negotiations go well, such a downgrade could be 
mitigated somewhat on a range from ensuring that UK citizens’ standing in 
the EU is equal to Moroccans in the Union, to Turks in the Union, the Swiss, 
and, finally to the EEA nationals: Norwegians, Liechtensteiners and 
Icelanders.82 Only the last two categories bring with them a right of free 
movement. Crucially however, every additional grade on this scale, means, – 
and this is the dilemma – that the ‘withdrawal’ is more and more elusive. Let 
us not forget that in all likelihood much more EU law applies in Iceland or 
Norway today than in the UK. In this context the political price of securing 
the privileges for own citizens following the withdrawal will most likely be 
very high. There is no reason at all to expect of the Union an altruistic attitude 
towards the (former) Member States busy ruining the European family as it 
stands today. This being said, tailored mutually-beneficial bilateral free 
movement of persons-arrangements between the withdrawing state and the 
Union as a whole or even a handful of other Member States could provide a 
realistic way forward in an unfortunate context where a decision to withdraw 
is taken and cannot be rolled back.  
  
                                                 
82 For the analysis of the exact rights of each of the proviledged categories of foreigners in the EU, 
see, e.g., D. Kochenov and M. van den Brink, ‘Pretending There Is No Union: Non-Derivative 
Quasi-Citizenship Rights of Third-Country Nationals in the EU’, in D. Thym and M. Zoetewij 
Turhan (eds.), Degrees of Free Movement and Citizenship, Leiden: Brill-Nijhoff, 2015. 
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Figure 183 
 
 
 
                                                 
83 The calculations used to produce the figure assume that the UK’s withdrawal from the EU 
terminates UK nationals’ supranational rights and follows the methodology of the Quality of 
Nationality Index (2016), op cit.  
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